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Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to document the use and the diffusion of the “new”
compensation and work organisation practices in Danish private sector firms and second, to
examine how and why firms differ regarding the adoption of different schemes. The analysis is
based on a detailed mail questionnaire answered by 1,600 Danish private sector firms.
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1 Three recent studies of the diffusion of the new practices in US firms are Black and
Lynch (2000), Freeman et al. (2000) and Osterman (2000). Curiously enough, there seem to
be more investigations into the effects of these practices. Most of these are, however, based
on unrepresentative samples; for exceptions, see Handel and Gittleman (1999), Black and
Lynch (2000) and Neumark and Capelli (2000).
1. Introduction
According to some accounts, and the business press in particular, firms’ compensation and hiring
practices as well as their work organisations have recently undergone marked changes aimed at
increasing the flexibility of cost structures, linking employees’ pay more closely to firm
performance and enhancing incentives for productive behaviour. This discussion  has been going
on for some years in most advanced industrialised countries and on both sides of the Atlantic (see
for instance, Snower (1999), Capelli (1997, 1999)). There is, however, relatively little
systematical empirical evidence on how prevalent these new pay and work practices are, what
differentiates firms that have adopted them from those who have not, and what implications they
have for the functioning of labour markets. This is not only true for Denmark, but holds more
generally. In fact a first attempt to provide a picture of the situation in the OECD area with
respect to new work practices has only recently been published in the OECD’s 1999 Employment
Outlook (OECD, 1999).
1
Looking at the literatures on “high involvement management”, “high performance/ flexible
workplace practices”, “the organisational revolution” and “human resources management” , one
can observe two broad positions. The first focuses on job design and argues that what matters is
the way work is organised. Job design theorists point to the need of the enrichment of jobs, of
more team-working, of increasing functional flexibility and/or involving workers (via quality3
2  Examples of the scant evidence of the prevalence of performance related pay
practices among firms are Brown (1990) for the United States, Drago and Heywood (1995)
for Australia, and Burgess and Metcalfe (2000) for Britain. There are surprisingly few
empirical studies of the effects of the introduction of PRP schemes; see Booth and Frank
(1999) and Lazear (2000) for two notable exceptions.
circles and TQM); see Gibbs and Levensohn (2001) for a discussion of these issues from an
economic perspective. The new work practices are expected to give rise to higher productivity.
Whether the productivity gains are shared with the employees, that is, lead to higher wages, is
an empirical question, however.
The second position focuses on performance related pay  – henceforth, PRP –  and emphasizes
the need to redesign monetary reward systems so as to create stronger incentives to ensure that
workers behave for the benefit of the firm or the organisation.
2  PRP theorists remain rather
sceptical about the virtues of re-engineering unless this is not accompanied by appropriate
economic incentives.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First to give a picture of the use of the “new” pay and work
organisation practices in Denmark and second, to attempt to understand how and why firms differ
with respect to the adoption of different schemes. More specifically, the questions I address are:
1. How common are employers that have implemented “new” compensation and work
organisation  practices?
2. Are some patterns of adoption more common than others? Do practices cluster?
3. What characteristic of firms are associated with the adoption of these new compensation and
work design practices?4
3 Organizing work in teams is defined as delegating the daily management of work to
a group of employees. Important aspects of team working is pooling of skills and skills
development of individual workers.
4 Job rotation is a job design which allows workers to rotate between different jobs
and tasks.
4. Do firms with new pay practices also differ with respect to the implementation of human
resources management practices, and in particular, to work organisation practices? 
The adoption of performance pay and new work practices can be measured along several
dimensions. It should be noted from the outset that  I consider only one of them: whether a firm
has adopted one of four PRP methods –  team bonus, individual bonus, stock and stock options,
and profit sharing –  for  four different categories of employees: top managers, middle-
management, white collar workers, and blue collar workers. I do not attempt to rank practices
according to some notion of their importance. One piece of information I do not have concerning
the implementation of practices is the proportion of employees affected by the particular
practices. Regarding new work practices the firms were asked whether they have adopted one
of six work designs – teams
3, job rotation
4, quality circles (that is, employee problem-solving
groups), total quality management, benchmarking and project organisation – for two groups of
employees: hourly paid workers and salaried employees (including managerial employees).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Next a brief description of the data set is
provided. The two following sections contains the analyses of the use and adoption of new
compensation and new work practices, respectively. Section 5 concludes.5
5 A notoriously difficult problem in surveying firms is to identify the right person in
each firm who is best suited to answer the questions asked. We were fortunate in being able
to use an address list constructed by Statistics Denmark, which included the relevant contact
person in each firm. This is one important reason for why the response rate turned out to be
quite high. Another contributing factor were the comments and advice given by Richard B.
Larsen of Dansk Industri (Confederation of Danish Industries), which were helpful in
designing the questionnaire.
6 A copy of the questionnaire in English is available from the author upon request.
2. The data
The survey was administered by Statistics Denmark as a mail questionnaire survey in May and
June 1999 which was sent out to 3,200 private sector firms with more than 20 employees. Thus,
the survey over-sampled large and medium-sized firms. The response rate was 51 per cent, which
is relatively high for a rather long and detailed questionnaire of the type that has been used here.
The survey represents a unique source of information on Danish firms’ internal labour markets
and changes therein. In addition to some background information about the firm, the firm
5 was
asked about its work organisation, compensation, recruitment, internal training practices and how
it evaluates its employees, as well as about eventual recent changes in these. For a brief
description of the questionnaire and the main results (in Danish), see Eriksson et.al. (2000).
6  
As already noted the response rate to the survey was 51 per cent, providing me with 1,605 useful
observations.  For the questions regarding compensation practices within the firms, the firms
were asked to distinguish between four different categories of employees: (i) managers, (ii)
middle management, (iii) other white collar workers, and (iv) blue collar and other hourly paid
workers. In connection with the questions concerning organisation of work the firms were asked
to distinguish between hourly paid workers and salaried employees (including managers).6
In what follows I shall be looking at four different forms of performance related pay practices:
team bonuses, individual bonuses, stock and stock options, and profit sharing and six different
work designs: teams, job rotation, quality circles, TQM, benchmarking and project organisation.
The survey data have been supplemented with additional information about the firms as well as
about their workforces. This information is taken from a large employee-employer linked
longitudinal data set which covers all private sector firms and all their employees during the
period 1980-97.
3. The use of new compensation schemes
The theoretical literature on performance related pay basically consists of two types of models.
One is principal-agency theory, which mainly focuses on optimal contracts in different situations,
but which also provide some predictions as to why payment schemes may differ across firms.
The second type of analysis looks at firms’ choice between input- or output based pay (Lazear
(1986), (2000)) and focuses on the role of monitoring and measurement costs. Theoretical work
on group based payment schemes is rather scarce; Kandel and Lazear (1992) analyse incentives
when work is organized in teams.
Let us to begin with look at Table 1, which gives some basic information about the incidence of
performance related pay practices in the firms surveyed. We may note that in almost two thirds
of the firms is there at least one worker category who receives PRP and that in 11 per cent of the
firms are all four employee categories subject to some form of PRP scheme. Not surprisingly,
PRP is most common among managers (in 48 per cent of the firms). As for  the other categories7
the differences across firms are fairly small. Thus, 35 per cent of the firms report using PRP for
their middle management staff, whereas 29 per cent of the firms have adopted these practices for
the white and blue collar workers.
Table 2 provides more detailed information about the frequency of the different PRP practices
for the different worker categories. As a quick look at the data immediately reveals that the
frequency of some practices vary with firm size, we also report  –  in brackets –  the
corresponding figures for firms with more than 350 employees.
Beginning with the top management of the firms, we can see that the most common forms of
PRP among managers are individual bonuses followed by profit sharing schemes. Of all firms,
8 per cent, and 20 per cent of firms with more than 350 employees, have compensation contracts
for their executives which include stock and/or stock options. The most common form of
performance pay among middle managers and white collar workers is individual bonuses. As for
the hourly paid workers, the single most implemented output-based pay scheme is team bonuses;
they are used by 17 (31) per cent of the (350+) firms.
As can be seen from the table, the larger companies are more likely than the smaller firms to pay
their employees, and their managers in particular, performance pay in form of individual bonuses
or stock and stock options. The differences between firms of different size are less pronounced
for the other forms of pay, save team bonuses which are considerably more prevalent in the larger
firms. Finally, the bottom row of the table shows the proportions of firms which report they have
implemented the payment form in question for at least one category of employees. Here we may
notice that individual and team bonus schemes are clearly the most adopted ones, whereas profit8
7 One example of regressors omitted from the preferred specification is age of firm.
Without controlling for industry, younger firms (established after 1980) are found to be more
likely to have PRP schemes.
sharing and stock and stock options are relatively rare.
Next we turn to look at some estimation results from logit models for whether firms make use
of performance related pay systems for the employees and for different sub-categories thereof.
We begin with a generous definition of a PRP using firm as one which has adopted at least one
of the following methods of payment: team bonuses, individual bonuses, profit sharing and
stock/stock options. As the data come from a survey directed at firms, the explanatory variables
predominantly refer to the firm.  Thus, the question addressed is: what differentiates firms which
have implemented PRP practices from those which have not? A set of results are displayed in
Table 3. The estimations shown in the table are the outcomes of a procedure where I have also
experimented with a host of other explanatory variables, and have discarded those which were
totally insignificant.
7 
The first column presents the estimates for all employees, that is, I do not take into account
which specific group of workers is subject to PRP. Thus, in order for the dependent variable to
be equal to one, it suffices that the firm uses one method for one group only. There are four
things worth noting here. First, the probability of having adopted a PRP scheme increases with
firm size. This is in contrast to previous studies, like Brown (1990), which have used
establishment level data for the US manufacturing sector, and have found a negative relationship.
This has been explained either by smaller firms having fewer hierarchical levels and hence less
promotion incentives or by the costs advantages of larger firms with respect to supervision,9
standardisation of work organisations, and spreading the fixed monitoring costs on a larger
workforce. Entering explanatory variables measuring the number of hierarchical levels does not
change the results at all. 
Second, the probability that employees in foreign owned firms (as well as in companies which
own subsidiary firms outside Denmark) receive some part of their pay based on performance is
higher than for Danish owned firms. This finding can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the
result can be explained by the higher monitoring costs foreign owned firms face because of the
geographical or cultural distance. As it is difficult for owners of foreign owned firms to supervise
management, performance related pay schemes are adopted. Secondly, the higher prevalence of
PRP in foreign firms may be due to these firms introducing the same pay practices in all their
subsidiaries, irrespective of location. As we will see later, foreign ownership is also of some
importance in explaining the use of new work practices. This suggests that the monitoring costs
cannot be the sole explanation, since work practices adoption should not be related to supervision
costs. 
Third, firms headed by a CEO who has been employed after 1995 have, everything else equal,
a higher probability of having adopted some form of PRP scheme. Fourth, firms which report
they mainly use internal recruitment and promotions in employing workers have a higher PRP
probability. This is somewhat unexpected as it has been suggested in the literature (Baker (1990),
Gibbs (1995)) that internal labour markets and incentive pay systems are likely to be substitutes;
firms which cannot offer career and promotion opportunities have to introduce other incentives
to motivate their employees to put forth effort, whereas firms which can provide these internal
labour market opportunities do not have to. On the other hand, the dummy for the CEO being10
promoted from within the firm, which can also be considered as a measure of the importance of
internal labour markets in the firm, attaches a statistically significant coefficient carrying the
expected negative sign for the adoption of individual bonus systems. Finally, the composition
of the workforce turns not out to be important for the adoption of PRP practices.
This pattern of results which is obtained for all employees as a group remains largely intact as
I distinguish between the four different PRP schemes. The only exception is profit sharing which
is unrelated to all the independent variables in Table 3. In particular, firm size and foreign
ownership are common explanatory variables of considerable importance in all four logit
estimations in columns (2) to (5). It is also worth noting that firms’ use of team and individual
bonuses in the main appears to be determined by the same factors.
What is insignificant is as interesting as is what is. Three variables which turned insignificant in
all but two cases were: a dummy for local wage agreement which is a measure of the presence
and influence of trade unions, the proportion of managerial employees which is a measure of
monitoring costs to the firm, and the proportion of female employees in the firm. The latter is
included to test for the hypothesis suggested by Goldin (1986) according to which firms with a
high female workforce share and thus, higher labour turnover, are less likely to invest in building
internal labour markets and use incentive schemes instead. Whether unions facilitate or makes
introduction of new pay practices more difficult is an interesting question which has received
some attention in the literature. The estimation results indicate that in general, the presence of
unions do not matter, except for the implementation of stock and stock options as a compensation
method. This is much less prevalent in firms with a local wage agreement. Stock and stock option
contracts are more common in firms with a higher female workforce  share.11
8 Accounting for the fact that whether the CEO is recruited from within or outside the
firm may depend on earlier firm performance yields yet another interpretation. If internal
mechanisms have failed, the firm may have appointed an outside CEO as well as introduced
incentive schemes to shake things up.
Moreover, the pattern is also replicated when we distinguish between the four different groups
of employees; see Table 4. As for managers, two new features are that managers in firms (i) with
a CEO that has been promoted from within the firm are less likely to be subject to PRP, and (ii)
which have higher than average training costs per employee are more likely to have a PRP
element in their manager’s compensation scheme are less likely to use performance pay for their
managers. The first observation indicates that firms with a tournament type promotion policy rely
to a lesser extent on other incentive schemes.
8 High training costs are in all likelihood positively
correlated with the skill level in the firm and may capture the sorting effect of providing PRP
schemes to employees, stressed by e.g. Lazear (2000). 
In the main whether middle managers are paid according to PRP schemes or not is determined
by the same factors as that of top management. For salaried workers the only new feature
observed is that a higher share of blue collar workers in the firm’s workforce is associated with
a lower probability that the firm uses PRP to provide incentives to its non-managerial white
collar workers.
The group which stands out as different with respect to the determinants of being paid PRP is the
hourly paid workers. The first thing to note is that the explanatory power of the logit model is
higher than for other groups.  Foreign owned firms are also more likely to pay their blue collar
workers performance pay as Danish owned companies but the quantitatively (in terms of the
marginal effect) the effect is considerably smaller than for other categories of employees. Firm12
size has a quantitatively smaller effect than for managerial employees. Being subject to foreign
competition and having a low share of white collar workers both increase the likelihood that the
firm’s hourly paid workers on top of their hourly wages receive some form of output based
compensation. The positive coefficient attached to the foreign competition dummy can be
interpreted in two different ways. One is that firms which are exposed to foreign competition are
also exposed to new ideas and innovations, including those in the area of compensation and
human resources management policy. Another interpretation is that adoption of new practices
enables them to compete internationally. The local wage agreement dummy is an indicator of the
presence and importance of unions in the firm. It attaches a positive but insignificant coefficient.
 
Since the logit estimates as such are not very informative concerning the magnitude of the effect
of a right hand side variable on the PRP probability, I have computed the marginal effects as
evaluated at the means of the independent variables and also carried out some computations
using a reference case on which we superimpose a number of changes in the explanatory
variables one at a time. Briefly summarising the results I find that the single most important
explanatory variable is foreign ownership and other quantitatively important factors are: main
competition coming from abroad (rather than from domestic firms) and internal recruitment
policy. The differences in relative importance of the explanatory variables are smaller for the
hourly paid workers. 
4. New work practices
I next turn to examine the prevalence of new forms of organising work in Danish firms. Let us
start by looking at Table 5. The first two columns show the proportion of firms which use the six13
9 The questionnaire contained an open alternative. Rather few firms used this option,
however, and there is no additional work practice which is implemented by more than 1 per
cent of the sample firms.
10 The picture emerging from this study resembles that shown for Denmark in OECD
(1999), but differs considerably from that of the only previous Danish survey on work
organisation, DISKO (1997).
different work designs asked about in the questionnaire
9 for salaried and hourly paid employees,
separately. The three remaining columns gives information as to when the firms were
reorganising work; in recent years, in the first half of the nineties or earlier.
A first thing we may notice is that the most used of the new work organisations are self-
managing teams – for both salaried and hourly paid workers – and project organisation for
salaried employees. These have been adopted by about a fourth of the firms. Job rotation is
another relatively frequently used design, especially for the hourly paid.
10 
As can be seen from the table, 30-40 per cent of the firms that have adopted the new work
practices have done so during the previous three years, and a third earlier in the nineties. Two
practices have a slightly different adoption pattern: benchmarking, which very few firms have
implemented (and only recently) and total quality management (TQM), which was introduced
in the early nineties and the incidence of which is relatively low. I also examined whether there
are differences between foreign and domestic owned firms as to when they have introduced the
NWPs. One possibility is that foreign owned firms adopt the practices earlier and the Danish
firms imitate them. As can be seen from the table, there are no signs of clear differences. Rather,
it seems as the diffusion of new practices have occurred at roughly the same pace in foreign and
domestic owned firms.14
Table 6 shows the incidence of new work practices for a number of firm characteristics. Here,
a firm is defined to have adopted a new work practice if it uses at least one of them for either the
salaried or the hourly paid part of its workforce. I have also computed the incidence for another
definition requiring that the firm has adopted at least one practice for both its salaried and hourly
paid workers. The pattern obtained by using this more narrow definition is essentially the same;
the only difference is that the incidence levels are considerably lower.
We may note that there are large differences across industries. The odds of having implemented
at least one new work practice are higher in manufacturing and the financial sector. The
construction and utilities industries have been slow in introducing new practices. Thus may
reflect the fact that these two industries are rather sheltered from competition. Foreign owned
firms are more likely than domestically owned companies to have adopted a new work
organisation design. Incidence rates are increasing in firm size and are very similar across firms
of different age. The prevalence of new work practices differ between firms with different
workforce compositions. Thus, firms with a high proportion of older workers, a low share of
female employees and a low share of employees with university degree or equivalent, are less
likely to have adopted these practices.
The second half of table contains incidence rates for firms which have and have not adopted or
changed its compensation policy, respectively. It can be seen that firms which report to have had
implemented significant reforms of their management structure during the last five years are
more likely to have adopted new work practices. Likewise,  firms which have introduced new
pay structures or have made use of external consultancy services to evaluate or change work
practices during the same period also have higher NWP incidence. Furthermore, firms which use15
performance pay schemes for their employees are also more likely to have adopted some of the
new work practices than those firms which do not make use of PRP. Thus, Table 6 tells us that
firms which have adopted the new pay practices have to a higher extent than other firms also
adopted new work practices. This is consistent with the frequently expressed view that there may
be complementarities between incentive compensation schemes and the new flexible work
practices; see Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Huselid (1995) and Ichniowski et al. (1995).    
In order to obtain some further information about what differentiates firms that have
implemented new work practices from those which have not, I have estimated logit models for
the adoption of each of the six work practices separately for the hourly paid and the salaried
workers.  The estimation results are set out in Tables 7 and 8. 
A first observation worth making is that firm size does influence the adoption of NWP’s for both
hourly paid workers and for salaried employees. There are two arguments for why size may
matter; see Osterman (1994) for a discussion. One is that reorganising work is associated with
fixed costs yielding economies of scale in larger firms, and so, implementation of new practices
is predicted to increase in firm size. Another is that larger firms are more bureaucratic and hence
less flexible, indicating that they are less likely to engage in reorganising work. The latter
hypothesis is not supported by the data.
In addition to firm size, dummies for the number of hierarchical levels (as reported by the firms
in the questionnaire) in the company were entered as explanatory variables. The hypothesis is that
less hierarchical firms have less need for improving communication and cooperation between
employees. This is not confirmed for most of the work practices. As a matter of fact, firms with16
11 One possibility is that newer firms are more likely to have new technologies. In
Table 5 above, we saw, however, that the incidence of NWP adoption did not differ between
firms of different age. A closer inspection, distinguishing between firms established in the
nineties and the eighties, did not alter this picture.
a relatively large number of levels in the hierarchy tend to have a lower, albeit insignificant,
probability of adopting the practice in question.
Foreign ownership, which was instrumental in explaining adoption of new pay practices, proved
also to be of some importance in differentiating between adopters and non-adopters of
alternative, flexible work organisations. Foreign owned firms are much more likely to have
introduced benchmarking and project organisation schemes for both their salaried and hourly
paid workers and TQM for the salaried employees than the domestically owned companies. 
It seems plausible to assume that the new, more flexible work practices often are implemented
in connection with introduction of new technologies. In fact, much of literature argues that
changes in technology (in particular, computers and micro-electronics) have lead to larger
variability in tasks and thus explain why employers are much more interested in introducing more
flexible work organisations than before.  Unfortunately, the data set does not contain information
about technology used nor about changes therein.
11
Given that introduction of new technology requires a more skilled labour force and/or
investments in skills, it is of some interest to examine how workforce composition is related to
the work practices adopted by the firms. Another reason is that since the new practices imply
greater variety and delegation of tasks, the NWPs themselves are likely to be complementary to
skills. In order to see if this pattern can be found in the data, a set of variables capturing the17
gender, age and education structure of each company’s workforce were entered as explanatory
variables into the logit model.
I find  that firms with a high proportion of younger workers (below the age of 30) seem to be
more likely to have introduced new work organisations, but the estimates do not differ
significantly from zero. A higher prevalence of NWPs in firms with more educated labour is
consistent with the view that the new practices are complementary to skills. This is borne out the
estimates for the salaried workers. Moreover, adoption of these practices is in all likelihood
associated with increased training within the firm and so, this is something one expect to see less
of in firms with relatively old workforce. Companies with a larger faction of females in the
workforce are less likely to have organised work in project organisations, whereas they are more
apt to use job rotations schemes for their salaried employees.
The earlier, chiefly case-based literature has discussed the role of unions in transforming work
organisations. The presence of unions can work both ways. In some cases unions fear  flexibility
will undermine their influence and hence oppose introduction of new practices. In other cases
unions have been said to have facilitated and mobilised support for introduction of new
technology and new work organisation. In the questionnaire the firm is asked whether it is a
member of the Employers’ Federation and whether it has signed a local wage agreement
(overenskomstaftale) with the trade unions. I have used this information to construct two dummy
variables which are included in the logit models. Some of them attach positive and significant
coefficients. Thus, in contrast to the new compensation practices, labour market organisations
seem to play a positive role facilitating change.18
12 This is not often controlled in the studies of the impact of NWP’s. Moreover, the
existing evidence is largely cross-sectional. The analysis of the consequences of NWP is on
my research agenda. 
13 See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for a theoretical analysis.
Firms which claim that they are paying higher wages to their employees than other employers
in the same local labour market are according to the estimates more likely to have adopted the
NWP’s. This is especially true for salaried employees. From this one should not, of course, draw
the conclusion that the new work practices lead to higher pay, for instance due to employers
sharing the productivity gains with their employees. Still, it is worth noting that this result is
obtained when controlling for workforce characteristics.
12 
So far I have only looked at whether the firms adopt at least one of the work practices or not, and
at firms’ use of the individual practices. Of course, this neglects that firms may be implementing
different numbers and combinations of practices. In fact, some studies of the effects of innovative
work practices have shown that they have positive effects on productivity predominantly when
firms use several practices in combination; see Ichniowski et al. (1996). The fact that new
practices work only when they are bundled together suggests that they are complementary, that
is, the return to one practice is increased by the use of another.
13  As can be seen from Table 9,
many of those companies which have adopted one of the new work practices have indeed
implemented more than just one. 
In order to see whether the number of practices used were related to some of the same factors as
the implementation of the individual practices, the number of practices adopted for managerial
and salaried employees and hourly paid workers separately were computed for each firm. This19
14 The questionnaire does not ask firms about how big a proportion of their workfor-
ces are covered by the work practices. As this is likely to be correlated number of practices
adopted, the results shown below give an indication of whether the neglect of the coverage
has significant effects the conclusions.
15 In interpreting the estimation results, it should be noted that the marginal effects are
not equal to the coefficients, nor is the sign of the effect of regressors unambiguously the
same as that of the coefficient, save the highest and lowest outcome probabilities; see Greene
(1993), pp. 672-674  for a discussion
simple measure of the extent to which the firms have introduced new work practices
14 was next
analysed by means of an ordered logit analysis.
Estimation results are given in Table 10.
15 What do I find? First, firm size has a positive but
quantitatively not very important effect. Second, not surprisingly in view of the previous results
regarding individual practices, foreign owned firms are more apt to have adopted several of the
new work practices for both their salaried and hourly paid employees. Third, the adoption of new
work practices are more likely to occur simultaneously with, or as a consequence of, the
implementation of other measures taken within the firm to do things differently than before.
Thus, the use of consultancy help in recent years increases the probability that a firm has adopted
several practices. Likewise, a recently employed chief executive officer increases the likelihood
that the firms implements several new work practices. This is reinforced if the CEO is employed
from outside the firm, which is more likely to happen if, because of poor performance of the
removed CEO,  it is considered necessary to shake things up.20
5. Summary and concluding comments
In this paper I have used a unique data set providing information on firms and their employees
in order to document the extent to which Danish firms have adopted new, performance related
pay and new work practices and to carry out some statistical analysis to identify their correlates.
The analysis concerns four different pay practices and five work practices. The findings regarding
the incidence of the new pay and work practices and changes over time therein, suggest that there
still are quite many firms which have not adopted many (or even any) of the new practices, but
that the proportion of firms implementing them is indeed increasing.
The findings strongly suggest that a number of variables are positively associated with the
adoption of performance pay practices. Thus, foreign owned firms, larger firms, and companies
with a relatively recently appointed CEO (recruited from outside the firm) are more apt have
made use of performance pay schemes. These are common determinants of the likelihood of
individual practices as well and point to the role of monitoring difficulties as suggested by the
personnel economics literature and to the importance of scale economies in practice adoption.
As for differences in the incidence of new work practices I find that foreign owned firms and
larger companies are more likely to have implemented the individual practices as well as several
of them. The presence of unions and firms being organised in the employers’ federation both
appear to be facilitating the introduction of new more flexible practices. For salaried workers,
there is some evidence that the new work practices are complementary to workforce skills.
Clearly, an interesting question concerning the introduction of new pay and work practices is
their consequences for the firms and their employees. This is on my agenda for future research.21
Table 1. Some sample characteristics
Firms with:
at least one category subject
to PRP
PRP in all worker categories
PRP for top, middle man- 
agers and salaried workers
PRP for top and middle     
management only
PRP
 for top managers
 for middle managers
 for salaried workers
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* For stock/stock options, it does not necessarily make sense to look at the share of all firms.
Rather, the natural “population at risk” is listed firms (options) or stock companies.22

















































































































































a A firm is defined to use a scheme if it has adopted it for at least one category of employees.
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of
significance.23











































































































































































































Source: Firm questionnaire; 1,605 firms25
Table 6. Incidence of new work practices by firm characteristics (%)
Industry:
Manufacturing                           64.9
Utilities                                      45.3
Construction                              49.5
Trade                                         36.9
Financial services                      74.6              
Other services                            50.0
All                                              57.2
Ownership:
Domestic                                    54.4
Foreign                                       66.7
Age of firm:
1. establ. before 1944                     56.7         
2. establ. 1945-67                           58.7
3. establ. 1968-80                           57.7
4. establ. 1981-                               57.3
Size (number of employees):
-49                                                  42.8
50-99                                              57.0
100-199                                          68.2
200-349                                          73.1
350-999                                          77.9
1000+                                             76.3
Proportion of workforce below 29 years of
age:
0-20 per cent                                   61.6
21 - 40 per cent                               58.7
41 per cent or more                         53.5
    Proportion females in workforce:              
    0-20 per cent                                   52.2
21 - 40 per cent                               59.8
41 per cent or more                         62.0
Proportion with at least 15 years of
schooling in workforce:
0-20 per cent                                   55.6
21 - 40 per cent                               64.0
41 per cent or more                         75.4
The firm has in recent (five) years:
Implemented new management structure
Yes                                              70.9
No                                               47.1
Introduced new pay structure
Yes                                              68.5
No                                               50.3
Used external consultancy services:
Yes                                              69.4
No                                               48.4
The firms pays:
PRP for at least one group of employees:
Yes                                                  67.6
No                                                   55.9
Higher wages than their competitors:
Yes                                                  64.4
No                                                   57.426













































































































































































































































































































Table 9. Prevalence of new work practices (per cent of firms)
Number of new work
practices




















Table 10. Ordered logit estimates of the number of NWP’s adopted
Independent variable: Coefficient Standard error
Firm size (number of
employees in thousands)
Foreign owned firm
Used consultancy help in
recent years
CEO employed after 1996
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